Introduction
A complex systems can become an economical problem. Understanding its internal machinery, describing it, and predicting its future behaviour can be expensive. The problem of finding simple, accurate, and efficient descriptions is a central aspect of the work on complex systems. Perhaps it is the unifying aspect of complex-systems science.
Interestingly, this practical problem is closely related to the philosophical problem of emergence [8, 4] . Stated in its weakest form, this is the question why, if the basic laws of physics are so simple, the world around us appears to have such a rich structure. A partial answer that easily comes to mind is this: If we would try to apply the basic laws every time we interpret the world around us, it would just take too much time. Instead we are using other descriptions that are more efficiently. But each applies only to a particular part of the world, so we need many of them. In the language of computer science [7] , we are trading computation time for description length. Apparently, this is a good deal. The structure of the world as we see it is a result of solving just the economic problem mentioned above. We are reducing the cost of describing the complex system "world". This is only a partial answer to the problem of emergence. Many questions remain unanswered, such as, "Why are there distinct parts for which efficient descriptions exist?" or "Can efficient descriptions be found systematically, and, if yes, how?". But it is this partial answer that will be of interest here, for it is itself incomplete.
Efficient, simplified descriptions are rarely perfectly precise, and somehow a decision has to be made which information about the thing described the description should reproduce, and which may be ignored. The conventional strategy to proceed when arriving at this part of the problem (e.g. [1, 2, 9] ) is to presupposed that the information regarding the thing described is incomplete anyway, and only the available information must be reproduced. This blurring of the picture comes under many different names: finite samples of noisy data, coarse graining, partitioning of the state space, e.t.c.. As a result, the choice of the simplified description becomes essentially a function of the mode of observation. But does this correspond to the facts? The history of science knows many examples of simplified descriptions (and related concepts) that have been introduced long before the things described could be observed. Obvious examples are descriptions in terms of quasi-particles such as "holes" and "phonons" used in solid state physics. On the other hand, descriptions that are much coarser than any reasonable limit of observation are also frequently used. One might just think of a description of traffic flow in terms of atomic "cars".
Shalizi and Moore [10] suggested a solution of this problem based on causal states [3] . Here, a different argument for reducing the information to be reproduced by a description is explored. Information regarding the thing described is dropped not because it is unavailable, but for the sake of an efficient and simple description. Central to this argument is the distinction between two kinds of descriptions: models, that produce data somehow similar to present or future real data, and characterizations that summarize some aspects of data.
Predictions about complex systems generally require both: a model that is used for the prediction, and a characterization that specifies what aspects of the real data the model is supposed to reproduce. By the condition that model and characterization are both simple and efficient, particular choices for the information to be retained by the descriptions are singled out. This part of the information is "relevant" for a simple reason: it can be predicted within given cost constraints.
In the remainder of this work, it is shown that this approach can be taken beyond hand-waving. Formal definitions of basic notions are introduced. Desiderata for economic descriptions are summarized under the notion of basic modelspecifying characterizations (b.m.s.c.), and it is shown that nontrivial b.m.s.c. exist. They are by far not unique. The accuracy and detail of preferred descriptions depends on the available resources, and the formalism is taking this into account. Results are illustrated by a minimal example.
The formalism
For the formal analysis, both models and characterizations are represented by computer programs. The complex system to be described is represented by a computer-controlled experiment. Fig. 1.1 n and a data format D ⊂ {0, 1} m to be fixed, with {0, 1} k denoting the set of all binary strings of length k and n, m ∈ N 0 . Given a control parameter value x ∈ C and being run, the experiment (including the D/A and A/D conversion) produces an output value y ∈ D. Input and output data can be sets of numbers, images, time-series, e.t.c.. The only major limitation is that both C and D are finite sets. The A/D conversion of the experimental output naturally involves some loss of information. But below it is argued that the information passing through the A/D converter can be much richer than the information tested for and being reproduced in the model. The information loss at the A/D converter is not decisive for determining the "emergent" description.
illustrates the interaction between
In general, the complex system involved in the experiment is not deterministic. The experimental output y is a realization of a random variable Y with values in D. The experiment is assumed reproducible in the sense that repeated runs of the experiment (with identical x) yield a sequence Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . of statistically independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) results.
Definition 1 For a given (deterministic) machine model, a test t is a program
that takes a control parameter x ∈ C as input, runs, and then halts with output 0, 1, or e. When the output is not e, the test can request several data samples before halting ("rerun" in Fig. 1.1 Now a cost functions is introduced which measures the cost involved in running models g and tests t, constructing and evaluating them, and performing experiments. We assume that this cost can be expressed in terms of the lengths L(t), L(g) ∈ N 0 of the programs t and g, their average execution times T (g), T (t) ∈ R ≥0 , and the average number N (t) ∈ R ≥0 of experimental runs required by t. To be specific, define T (·) as the maximum of the expectation value of the runtime over all x ∈ C and all distributions of input data, N (·) analogously. It can be shown that T (t) and N (t) are always finite. As conventional, the number of tests or generators q with L(q) ≤ n is assumed to be finite all n ∈ N 0 .
In practice, the cost of descriptions depends strongly on the circumstances. The theory should therefore be independent of the particular choice of the cost function. For this purpose, as is made clear by Theorem 3 below, the following definition is convenient. 
(for generators without the last condition) and
A test or generator p is said to be ≺-minimal in a set P of tests or generators if p ∈ P and there is no p ′ ∈ P such that p ′ ≺ p.
Lemma 1 Relation is transitive and reflexive, relation ≺ is transitive and antireflexive.
(Since is not antisymmetric, it is not a partial order.) The proof is standard.
Lemma 2 For any two tests or generators p 1 , p 2 , and any cost function
Proof Assume that p 1 and p 2 are generators. Then L(p 1 ) ≤ L(p 2 ) and T (p 1 ) ≤ T (p 2 ) and either L(p 1 ) < L(p 2 ) or T (p 1 ) < T (p 2 ), since if both were equal the last part of condition (1.2) would be violated. Thus, using the strict monotony of K, one has either
For tests the proof is analogous.
Theorem 3 Let P be a set of tests or generators. p ∈ P is ≺-minimal in P if and only if there is a cost function K that attains its minimum over P at p.
Proof The "if" part: If some K would attain its minimum over P at p but p was not ≺-minimal, there would be a p ′ ∈ P such that p ′ ≺ p and, by Lemma 2,
. But this contradicts the premise. So p is ≺-minimal. The "only if" part: Assume p is ≺-minimal in a set of generators P . We show that there is a cost function that attains its minimum over P at p by explicit construction. K(l, t) := κ(l, L(p)) + κ(t, T (p)) with κ(z, z 0 ) = z for z ≤ z 0 and κ(z, z 0 ) = L(p) + T (p) + z for z > z 0 does the job. Obviously K satisfies strict monotony. And any
is the minimum of K over P . For tests the proof is analogous.
Lemma 4 Every nonempty set P of tests or generators contains an element p which is ≺-minimal in P .
Proof Assume that P has no ≺-minimal element. Then for every element p ∈ P there is a p ′ ∈ P such that p ′ ≺ p. Thus an infinite sequence of successively always-cheaper (≺) elements of P can be constructed. Because ≺ is transitive and antireflexive, such a sequence contains each element at most once. Let q be the first element of such a sequence. Since by definition p ≺ q implies L(p) ≤ L(q), and there is only a finite number of programs q with L(q) ≤ L(p), the number of successors of p cannot be infinite. So the premise that P has no ≺-minimal element is wrong for any nonempty P .
The ≺-minimal element is generally not unique. Different ≺-minima minimize cost functions that give different weight to the resources length, time, and, experimental runs used. On the other hand, it turns out that in practice the machine dependence of relation ≺ for implementations of algorithms on different processor models is weak. Therefore, instead of cost functions, relation ≺ is used below.
A central element of statistical test theory [6] is the power function. It is defined as the probability that the test rejects data of a given (usually parameterized) distribution. The goal of statistical test theory is to find tests who's power function is below a given significance level α if the null-hypothesis is satisfied, and as large as possible otherwise.
Denote by the test function t x ({y i }) the output of the test t at control parameter x ∈ C[t] when applied to the sequence of experimental results {y i } ∈ D ∞ (for formal simplicity, the sequences {y i } are assumed infinite, even though tests use only finite subsequences).
Definition 5 For any test t, the power of the test function t x , when applied to the random sequence {Y i } with values in D
∞ , is the probability of rejecting
Unlike in conventional test theory, there is no independent null hypothesis H 0 here that states the distribution or the class of distributions of {Y i } that is tested for. Instead, given a test function t x , the null hypothesis, i.e., the class of distributions, is defined by the condition
where 0 < α < 1 is a fixed 1 significance level.
Now the concepts from statistics and computer science introduced above are combined. Denote by g x the sequence {Y i } of random outputs of generator g at control parameter x.
Definition 6 A generator g is an optimal generator relative to a test t and a power threshold 1 > γ > α (notation: opt
for every generator
Hence g is, for some cost function, the minimal (-cost) model for the property that t is testing for. Condition 2. can be satisfied only for particular choices of t. It requires a minimal power γ from t to distinguish the models that it characterizes from those is does not. Constructing tests that maximize γ leads to results similar to the locally most powerful tests of statistical test theory [6] . 
Definition 7 Call a generator g an optimal implementation with respect to a setC
for all x ∈C} (the set of generators that do exactly the same).
Theorem 5
For everyC ⊂ C, every optimal implementation g with respect tõ C, and every 1 > γ > α there is, a test t such that opt 
Definition 8 Call a pair
That is, for some cost function the test t gives the minimal characterization required to specify g (given power threshold γ and range of validity C[t]). Sometimes there are other generators which are similar to g but cheaper. Then t must be very specific to characterize the particularities of g. In other cases, the output of g has an essentially new, "striking" property which cannot be obtained with cheaper generators. If the property is really "striking", a rather cheap and generic test t is sufficient to detect it. Thus t can ignore all other information contained in the output of g. Such an approximate characterization is most likely to apply also to the data of an actual experiment. Then the b.m. Proof Fix some 1 > γ > α. By Theorem 5, the set S := {t ′ |opt
} is nonempty. Theorem 6 is satisfied by any t which is ≺-minimal in S. By Lemma 4 such an element exists.
A simple example
As a minimal, analytically traceable example, consider an experiment without control parameters C = ∅ in which only a single bit is measured, D = {0, 1}. The probability p for the cases y = 0 to occurs is exactly p = 0.52 and the "complexity" of the systems consists just in this nontrivial value. With α = 0.1, the following pair (t, g) is a b.m.s.c.: A generator g [with L(g) = 52 byte and T (g) = 56 υ on the mmix model processor [5] ; the unit of time reads "oops"] that outputs y = 0 and y = 1 with exactly equal probability p = 1/2, and a test t (L(t) = 104 byte and T (t) = 255 υ) that verifies if among N = 5 samples both y = 0 and y = 1 occur at least once. This test is the cheapest test that accepts the model g (pow(t, {g}) = 1/16 ≤ α) and rejects all cheaper models, namely One might think of g, g * , and some exact g * * as a primitive from of different levels of description for the same experiment.
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